The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Thomas C. Horne; Bruce R. Wisan; Mark Shurtleff; and hon. Denise Posse Lindberg; et al. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2012
The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Thomas C. Horne; Bruce R.
Wisan; Mark Shurtleff; and hon. Denise Posse
Lindberg; et al. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rodney R. Parker; Richard A. Van Wagoner; Snow, Chrstenensen and Martineau; Kenneth A.
Okazaki; Stephen C. Clark; Ryan M. Harris; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough; Attorneys
for Plantiff-Appellee.
C. Frederick Beckner III; Kathleen Mueller; Amy Markopoulous; Sidley Austin LLP; Attorneys for
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, No. 20120158.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
2012).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3154
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, 
Plaintiffs and Appellee 
v. 
Thomas C. Home; Bruce R. Wisan; Mark 
Shurtleff; 
and Hon. Denise Posse Lindberg; et al., 
Defendants and Appellants 
CASENO.20120158-SC 
On Certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
Case Nos. 11-4049, 11-4050, 11-4053, 11-4059, 
11-4066, 11-4071, 11-4072 & 11-4076 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS' SPECIAL FIDUCIARY WISAN 
AND HONORABLE DENISE POSSE LINDBERG 
Rodney R. Parker 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Kenneth A. Okazaki 
Stephen C. Clark 
Ryan M. Harris 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8414 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
C. Frederick Beckner III 
Kathleen Mueller 
Amy Markopoulos 
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 
1501 K Street NW 
Washington DC 20005 
Telephone: (202) 736-8151 
Fax:(202)736-8711 
Email: cbeckner@sidley.com 
kmueller@sidley.com 
amarkopoulos@sidley.com 
Attorneys for Judge Denise Posse 
Lindberg 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR 2 0 2012 
£tti&A£t«^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, 
Plaintiffs and Appellee 
v. 
Thomas C. Home; Bruce R. Wisan; Mark 
Shurtleff; 
and Hon. Denise Posse Lindberg; et al., 
Defendants and Appellants 
CASENO.20120158-SC 
On Certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
CaseNos. 11-4049, 11-4050, 11-4053, 11-4059, 
11-4066, 11-4071, 11-4072 & 11-4076 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS' SPECIAL FIDUCIARY WISAN 
AND HONORABLE DENISE POSSE LINDBERG 
Rodney R. Parker 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Kenneth A. Okazaki 
Stephen C. Clark 
Ryan M. Harris 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8414 
C. Frederick Beckner III 
Kathleen Mueller 
Amy Markopoulos 
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 
1501 K Street NW 
Washington DC 20005 
Telephone: (202) 736-8151 
Fax:(202)736-8711 
Email: cbeckner@sidley.com 
kmueller@sidley.com 
amarkopoulos@sidley.com 
Attorneys for Judge Denise Posse 
Lindberg 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Brent M. Johnson 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE COURTS 
PO Box 140241 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0241 
Telephone: (801)578-3800 
Email: brentj @email.utcourts.gov 
Attorney for Judge Denise Posse 
Lindberg 
Jeffrey Shields 
Mark Callister 
Zachary Shields 
Michael D. Stanger 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & 
MCCULLOUGH 
10 East South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Email: jlshields@cnmlaw.com 
mcallister@cnmlaw.com 
zachshields@cnmlaw.com 
mstanger@cnmlaw.com 
Attorneys for Bruce R. Wisan, Special 
Fiduciary 
( 
( 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LIST OF PARTIES 
Dean Joseph Barlow 
Donald Ronald Fisher 
Walter Scott Fisher 
The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
Richard Gilbert 
Thomas C. Home, Attorney General for the State of Arizona 
Brent Jeffs 
Honorable Denise Posse Lindberg, Judge of the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
Richard Jessop Ream 
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General for the State of Utah 
Thomas Samuel Steed 
Bruce R. Wisan, Special Fiduciary of the United Effort Plan Trust 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LIST OF PARTIES 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT REGARDING DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF CERTIFIED QUESTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
Background on the UEP Trust. 4 
Abuse of the Trust 5 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties/Abandonment of the Trust 6 
The Probate Action 7 
Reformation of the Trust..... 10 
Reliance on the Reformed Trust 12 
Collateral Attacks on the Final Reformation Judgment 13 
The Extraordinary Writ Action 14 
The Federal Court Action 17
 { 
The Entry of the Preliminary Injunction 18 
Additional Briefing in the Utah Supreme Court 19 
The Tenth Circuit Court Stays the Preliminary Injunction 20 
The Tenth Circuit Certifies A State Law Ouestion To The Utah 
Supreme Court 21 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 22 
ii 
* 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 25 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA PROMOTES 
JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND PROTECTS LITIGANTS 
FROM THE BURDEN OF RELITIGATING A CLAIM 
WITH THE SAME PARTY 26 
II. THE DISMISSAL OF A CLAIM ON GROUNDS OF 
LACHES IS A DECISION "ON THE MERITS" FOR 
PURPOSES OF RES JUDICATA EVEN THOUGH IT 
DOES NOT DECIDE THE "ULTIMATE SUBSTANTIVE 
ISSUES" OF THE CLAIM 27 
III. A UTAH COURT'S DENIAL OF A PETITION FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT UNDER RULE 65B IS 
RES JUDICATA IF IT AFFIRMATIVELY APPEARS 
THAT THE DENIAL WAS INTENDED TO BE ON 
THE MERITS 35 
IV. BECAUSE THIS COURT HELD THAT THE FLDS 
ASSOCIATION'S CHALLENGE TO THE MODIFICATION 
OF THE UEP TRUST IS BARRED BY LACHES, THE 
DISMISSAL OF THE RULE 65B PETITION IS A 
DECISION ON THE MERITS THAT IS RES JUDICATA 
IN A SUBSEQUENT ACTION 38 
CONCLUSION 41 
RULE 24(A)(11) STATEMENT 41 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(F)(1) 43 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 44 
in Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Am. Nat'I Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Chic, 
826 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1987) .. 28 
Angel v. Bullington, 
330 U.S. 183 (1947) 22, 27 
Burleigh v. Turner, 
388 P.2d 412 (Utah 1964) 37 
Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 
784 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1986) 31 
Carpenter v. Reed, 
757 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1985) 25 
City ofElmhurst v. Kegerreis, 
64N.E.2d450(Ill.~1945) 36 
Comm 'r v. Sunnen, 
333 U.S. 591 (1948) .. 27 
Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, , 
735 P.2d 387 (Utah Ct.App. 1987) 26 
Day v. Estate of Wisv^all, 
381 P.2d 217 (Ariz. 1963) 31 
< 
DeVargas v. Montoya, 
796 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Newcomb 
v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1987) 30 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindbergh < 
2010 UT51, 238 P.3d 1054 passim 
Gates v. Taylor, 
2000 UT 33, 997 P.2d 903 24, 37, 38 
IV 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jarrettv. Gramling, 
841 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1988) .. 30 
Jeffs v. State, 
No. 03-11-00568-CR, 2012 WL 1068797 (Tex. App. Mar. 29, 2012) 6 
Jeffs v, Stubbs, 
970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998) 4 
Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, 
5 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2000) ....33 
Kennecott Copper Corp, v. Salt Lake Cnty., 
575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978) . 36 
Mackv. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 
2009 UT 47, 221 P.3d 194 22, 26 
Macris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 
2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 . 26 
Meagher Cnty, Newlan Creek Water Dist. v. Walter, 
547 P.2d 850 (Mont. 1976) .- 36 
Murphy v. A/S Sobral, 
187 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) 31 
Murphy v. Klein Tools, Inc., 
935 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991) 28 
Myers v. Bull, 
599 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1979) .....29 
Nathan v. Rowan, 
651 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1981) 29 
N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Bos. Med. Grp., 
906 A.2d 1042 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) 29 
Owens v. Okure, 
488 U.S. 235 (1989) ......28 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Paxton v. Ward, 
199 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) 
Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 
669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983) 
Plautv. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 
514 U.S. 211 (1995) 
Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 
224 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2000) 
PRCHarris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 
700 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1983) 
Ramirez-Pabon v. Bd. of Personnel, 
254F.2dl(lstCir . 1958) 
Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 
904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995) 
Rose v. Town of Harwich, 
778F.2d77(lstCir. 1985) 
Shoup v. Bell & Howell Co., 
872 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1989) 
Smith v. City of Chic, 
820 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1987) 
Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 
429 N.E.2d 746 (N.Y. 1981) 
Smith v. Smith, 
793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
State ex rel. Hamilton v. Cohn, 
95P.2d38(Wash. 1939) 
State v. Barrett, 
2005 UT 88, 127P.3d682 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Cahoon, 
2009 UT 9, 203 P.3d 957 23, 30 
United Effort Plan Trust v. Holm, 
101 P.3d 641 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) 6 
United States v. Oppenheimer, 
242 U.S. 85(1916) 30 
Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 
67 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1933) 28 
Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 
186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950) 29 
STATUTES 
28 U.S.C. §1738 2, 25, 30 
Texas Penal Code Ann. § 22.011 6 
Texas Penal Code Ann. § 22.021 6 
Utah Code Ann. §16-7-6.... .....A 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-401 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-101 et. seq 7 
RULE 
UtahR. App. P. 19 14 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) 35 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
18A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 
2002) 23, 28, 31, 35 
E.T. Tsai, Annotation, Judgment Granting or Denying Writ of Mandamus or 
Prohibition as Res Judicata, 21 A.L.R. 3d 206 (1968) 24, 35, 36 
vii Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT REGARDING DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and 
regulations that are of central importance to the issues presented for review. 
STATEMENT OF CERTIFIED QUESTION 
Under Utah preclusion law, is the Utah Supreme Court's discretionary 
review of a petition for extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches 
grounds a decision "on the merits" when it is accompanied by a written opinion, 
such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case presents the issue of whether plaintiff, an unincorporated 
association of Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
members (hereinafter "FLDS Association"), can relitigate the virtually identical 
claims that this Court expressly held barred by laches in Fundamentalist Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054. 
This case arises out of the Utah probate court's reformation of the United , 
Effort Plan Trust ("the Trust"). The Utah probate court (Lindberg, J.) began 
supervising the Trust more than six years ago after the trustees abandoned the 
i 
Trust rather than defend allegations that Warren Jeffs, the President of the 
Corporation of the President of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of 
i 
Latter-Day Saints, Inc. ("COP") and presiding trustee of the Trust, had engaged in 
1 
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extreme misconduct, including allegations of child sexual abuse. Rather than 
appeal the state probate court's final reformation judgment, the FLDS Association 
waited nearly three years before collaterally attacking it, both by filing a §1983 
lawsuit in federal district court and subsequently seeking virtually identical relief 
in a petition for extraordinary writ in this Court. 
After the FLDS Association agreed to stay the federal court action and 
proceed first with the petition for extraordinary writ, this Court held the FLDS 
Association's constitutional challenge to the reformation of the Trust barred by 
laches. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054. The Court explained: 
[M]any individuals have relied upon the district court's final order 
from over three years ago, and the FLDS Association has given no 
adequate explanation for its delay in appealing or otherwise 
petitioning for relief The FLDS Association has shown a lack of 
diligence in challenging the modification of the Trust, and this lack of 
diligence has operated to the detriment of others. The FLDS 
Association offers no adequate explanation for its delay and no other 
circumstances exist that might make us otherwise hesitant to apply 
laches. 
Notwithstanding this Court's thorough examination of the issues and 
detailed factual and legal findings, and notwithstanding the requirements of the 
federal "Full Faith and Credit" statute, 28 U.S.C. §1738, the district court 
concluded that res judicata does not apply because this Court did not pay sufficient 
attention to the "merits" of the FLDS Association's claim in its Lindberg decision. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Appellants' Appendix ("Aplt.App.") 62-64. Instead of dismissing the association's 
attempt to relitigate claims this Court had concluded could not proceed, the district 
court held that the First Amendment prohibited the Utah probate court from 
applying Utah law to reform the Trust to protect its intended beneficiaries. To 
remedy the alleged constitutional violation, the district court issued a preliminary 
injunction staying all proceedings in the probate court, suspending the Special 
Fiduciary, and transferring control of the Trust's substantial assets to Jeffs (as 
President of the COP), the very individual whose improper conduct necessitated 
the probate action in the first instance. 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stayed the district court's extraordinary 
injunction and, subsequently, certified to this Court the question whether "[u]nder 
Utah preclusion law . . . the Utah Supreme Court's discretionary review of a 
petition for extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches grounds [is] a 
decision 'on the merits' when it is accompanied by a written opinion, such that 
later adjudication of the same claim is barred." Order Certifying State Law 
Questions at 8, Doc. No. 01018803969 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 2012). This Court 
should answer that question in the affirmative and confirm that its prior decision in 
Lindberg was "on the merits" for purposes of claim and issue preclusion. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To put this case into context, we discuss the background of the Trust, Jeffs' 
breach of fiduciary duty and abuse of the Trust, the ensuing probate action to 
protect the Trust, and the related federal and state proceedings concerning the 
FLDS Association's collateral attacks on the reformation of the Trust. 
Background on the UEP Trust, The Trust was created in 1942 by 
members of the "Priesthood Work" association. Aplt.App.25, 1221. Through the 
years, numerous people donated land to the Trust and made improvements on Trust 
land. Aplt.App.2007. Today, the Trust property consists almost entirely of land 
and improvements, including over 5,000 acres and 700 homes located in Hildale, 
Utah; Colorado City, Arizona; and British Columbia, Canada. Aplt.App.26, 5781-
5783. 
Disputes began to arise about what property rights, if any, individuals who 
contributed property and/or improvements to the Trust enjoyed. See Jeffs v. 
Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998). In the 1990s, while such litigation was 
pending, Rulon Jeffs organized a church for his followers (the "FLDS Church"), 
formed the COP under the Utah Corporation Sole statute, Utah Code Ann. §16-7-6, 
and designated himself as president of the FLDS Church and "Corporate Sole" of 
the COP, thus giving himself the power to conduct all church legal affairs. See 
Articles of Incorporation, dated February 6, 1991, filed with the Utah Dep't of 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Commerce, https://secure.utah.gov/bes/action; see also Aplt.App.25, 241, 245, 
5593. 
After this Court held that the Trust was a private trust, Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 
1253, Rulon Jeffs and other trustees in 1998 executed an amended Trust (the 
"1998 Restatement") that purported to convert the Trust to a charitable trust with 
the "religious purpose" of providing "for Church members according to their 
wants and their needs, insofar as their wants are just ...." Aplt.App.243. 
Apparently intending to eliminate the rights granted private beneficiaries in Stubbs, 
the 1998 Restatement declared that a person who is deemed uncommitted to the 
FLDS Church may be removed from Trust property without returning any property 
that person provided to the Trust. Id. The 1998 Restatement further stated that the 
Trust was to be "of perpetual duration," but, in the event of termination, the Trust 
assets would become property of the COP. Aplt.App.244. 
In 2002, Rulon Jeffs died and his son, Warren Jeffs, became Corporate Sole 
of the COP and president of the Board of Trustees of the Trust. Aplt.App.28. 
Abuse of the Trust. There is substantial evidence that while serving as 
trustee, Warren Jeffs engaged in illegal conduct (polygamy and sexual activity 
with children) and caused his followers to engage in similar unlawful conduct by 
commanding and performing "marriages" of young girls to older men who were 
5 
4 
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already married.1 E.g., Aplt.App. 1981-1983, 3127-3149. Evidence also shows 
that the Trust was used as a means of punishing those who refused Jeffs' demands 
to engage in illegal conduct. E.g., Aplt.App.5594. Indeed, a court found that 
Jeffs tried to evict a family from its home on Trust land within ten minutes after 
the mother refused to comply with Jeffs' demand that her 15-year-old daughter 
"marry" an already-married 39-year-old man. See United Effort Plan Trust v. 
Holm, 101 P.3d 641, 643 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties/Abandonment of the Trust. In 2004, the 
Trust, the FLDS Church, and Jeffs were named co-defendants in two tort lawsuits 
(the "Tort Lawsuits") brought by individuals (the "Tort Plaintiffs") seeking large 
awards based on allegations that Jeffs used the Trust to coerce illegal activity. 
Aplt.App.28, 3623-3673. Jeffs subsequently transferred much of the Trust's 
valuable non-residential property to entities that he controlled, which gave rise to 
claims for fraudulent transfer. Aplt.App.5159-5190, 5256-5269. Jeffs also 
gathered and hid the Trust's records. Aplt.App. 1984-1985. 
Furthermore, this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that Warren Jeffs was 
convicted by a jury in Texas for aggravated sexual assault of a child and sexual 
assault of a child in violation of Texas Penal Code Ann. §§22.011, 22.021, and was 
sentenced to "confinement for life and twenty years, respectively . . . ." Jeffs v. 
State, No. 03-11-00568-CR, 2012 WL 1068797, at *1 (Texas App. Mar. 29, 2012) 
(dismissing Jeffs' appeal for want of prosecution). 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Jeffs and the other trustees failed to defend the Trust in the Tort Lawsuits. 
Aplt.App.28. This was a conscious decision by Jeffs, who forbade his followers 
from becoming involved in the Tort Lawsuits with the instruction: "Answer them 
nothing and don't give them any testimony or witness." Aplt.App.28? 1990. 
Failure to defend the Trust exposed it to default judgments and placed the 
homes of the people residing upon Trust property at risk. Aplt.App.29, 1093-1095. 
Rodney Parker and the law firm of Snow Christensen & Martineau (attorneys for 
the COP and the Trust) withdrew as counsel and filed motions in the Tort Lawsuits 
stating that: (1) no court had ruled on the character of the 1998 Restatement; (2) 
occupants of the Trust's lands may have enforceable interests in the property of the 
Trust; (3) those who lived on Trust property should be given notice, advised to 
obtain counsel, and given an opportunity to protect their interests; and (4) the state 
Attorney General should be notified if the Trust is deemed to be a charitable trust. 
Aplt.App.614-625, 2003-2010. 
The Probate Action. After receiving notice of the trustees' breach, the 
Utah Attorney General on May 26, 2005, filed a petition initiating an in rem 
probate action (the "Probate Action") in the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah (the "probate court") pursuant to the Utah Uniform Trust Code (Utah 
Code Ann. §75-7-101 et seq.). Aplt.App.565-583. The petition requested 
multiple remedies, including removal of the trustees, the appointment of a special 
7 
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fiduciary to administer the Trust, and, if the court deemed it necessary, the 
reformation of the Trust at the request of an interested party. Aplt.App.582-583. 
As much of the Trust's property and beneficiaries are located in Arizona, 
Aplt.App.5782, the Arizona Attorney General also appeared in the Probate Action 
in support of the petition, Aplt.App.l 183-1191, 5847. 
Some individual beneficiaries of the Trust (the "Private Beneficiaries") also 
filed a petition in the Probate Action alleging that the Trust was a private trust and 
seeking remedies identical to those sought by the Attorneys General. 
Aplt.App.5198-5217. The Tort Plaintiffs likewise appeared in the Probate Action, 
asserting that the Trust was private and reserving the right to challenge the validity 
of the 1998 Restatement. Aplt.App.5218-5244. 
Notice of the Probate Action was served in compliance with Utah Code Ann. 
§75-1-401, including service upon the defaulting trustees and the COP and service 
by publication on persons believed to assert interests in the assets of the Trust. See 
Aplt.App.5295-5296, 5302-5304, 5324-5431, 5385-5431, 5438-5448, 5450-5504, 
5696-5697. Notice was also published in newspapers in states where interested 
persons were known to be living or conducting activities on Trust property. 
Aplt.App.5465-5470, 5482-5504, 5696-97. Notice was served upon Rodney 
Parker (COP's registered agent) from the beginning of the Probate Action, 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Aplt.App.5302-5304, 5438, and continually thereafter because Parker filed a 
request to remain on the official service list, Aplt.App.5904. 
After service of notice of the Probate Action, and having received no 
opposition, the probate court (Himonas, J.) suspended the trustees and appointed 
Bruce Wisan as a Special Fiduciary on June 22, 2005. Aplt.App.5449, 790-798. 
The Probate Action was subsequently re-assigned to Judge Lindberg, who invited 
input from all interested persons and defined a broad class of people who would 
have standing to propose new trustees, including the COP, the trustees, and all 
beneficiaries of the Trust (broadly defined as anybody who had donated property, 
time, talents, or resources). Aplt.App.5473. 
The FLDS Association's members knowingly refused to participate in the 
Probate Action. Aplt.App.28-30. Jeffs told his followers that the Judge and the 
Special Fiduciary were "of the devil," and instructed them to "continue to answer < 
them nothing." Aplt.App.1994. Jeffs and the other suspended trustees also failed 
to comply with the probate court's order to provide an accounting and turn over 
assets and records. Aplt.App.29, 5772. Instead, Jeffs immediately arranged to 
destroy many documents and to hide others in a vault in Texas. Aplt.App.2000-
< 
2001. 
2
 Many interested persons appeared or otherwise communicated with the probate 
court, but none objected to the suspension of the trustees or the appointment of the i 
Special Fiduciary. See, e.g., Aplt.App.5198, 5218, 5432, 5566, 5577-5602, 5698. 
9 
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Reformation of the Trust. On December 13, 2005, the probate court 
issued a 28-page Memorandum Decision addressing a number of significant issues 
concerning the administration of the Trust. Aplt.App. 1567-1596. The court held 
that the 1998 Restatement was the "operative" trust instrument, and it created a 
charitable Trust. Aplt.App. 1572-1574, ffijlO-15. The court also found that the 
suspended trustees "committed serious breaches of trust," Aplt.App.1576, f21, 
demonstrated "unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure" to administer the 
Trust, id, violated their duty of loyalty and the requirement of prudent 
administration, id., failed to defend against the Tort Lawsuits, Aplt.App.1577,1J22, 
and violated court orders requiring an accounting of current Trust administration, 
id. 
Because a "fundamental tenet of the COP involves the illegal practice of 
polygamy," the probate court found that the Trust would "fail if its sole purpose 
was to advance those illegal religious practices." Aplt.App.1581, ^ [33 (emphasis in 
original). The court concluded, however, that the "drafters would have preferred 
that the Trust survive to accomplish its stated purpose of providing for the needs 
and 'just wants' of its beneficiaries, rather than fail for want of a lawful purpose." 
Aplt.App.5282, p 3 . In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the Utah 
"Code's broad intent to preserve charitable trusts whenever possible." Id. 
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The probate court also found that allowing the Trust to fail and applying the 
reversionary clause would place the Trust assets in Jeffs' hands despite his breach 
of fiduciary duties and use of Trust assets for illegal purposes. Aplt.App.1589, 
ffl[51-53. This result, the court found, would be "inequitable." Aplt.App.1590, 
1(53 n.26. 
Instead, the probate court invoked the atime-honored doctrine of cy pres" 
which allows a court to modify a trust consistent with the settlor's charitable 
purpose if "a particular charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, 
impossible to achieve or wasteful." Aplt.App.1575, ]fl9. The court then outlined a 
framework to reform the Trust, guided by three legal principles: (1) preserving the 
Trust's general charitable purpose—"caring for needy individuals," 
Aplt.App.1580, ]f31; (2) removing the Trust's illegal purposes—including 
"polygamy, bigamy, [and] sexual activity between adults and minors," 
Aplt.App.1580, ffl|31, 33; and (3) employing "neutral principles of law" to avoid 
entangling church and state, Aplt.App. 1582-1583, ^[35-37. 
The probate court concluded by inviting "all interested parties to identify 
any issues relative either to the analysis employed by the Court or the framework 
discussed above." Aplt.App. 1594, ^[63; see also Applt.App.1580, f32 n.53. The 
Special Fiduciary provided notice of the reformation process by mail to those who 
appeared in the case. Aplt.App.6006-6008. The Special Fiduciary also mailed a 
11 
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written notice to each residence on Trust land informing the residents about the 
Memorandum Decision and providing an Internet address where it could be 
viewed. Aplt.App.5903, 2170. Thereafter, the Special Fiduciary sent a second 
notice to each residence on Trust land discussing the Memorandum Decision and 
the status of the Trust's planned reformation. Aplt.App.6003-6005. 
Notwithstanding such notices, no member of the FLDS Association 
appeared, provided input, or presented themselves as a possible trustee. 
Aplt.App.30, 1593, f61 n.95. The Special Fiduciary, the Attorneys General, and 
some members of the Trust's beneficiary class, however, cooperatively prepared a 
proposed reformed trust declaration in accordance with the framework stated in the 
Memorandum Decision. Aplt.App.5906-5920, 5925-5971. 
On October 25, 2006, the probate court signed the Reformed Declaration of 
Trust and an accompanying Order formally removing the trustees and certifying 
the reformation as a final judgment (the "Reformation Judgment"). Aplt.App.83 8-
863, 865-872. No person filed an appeal or other opposition to the Reformation 
Judgment. Aplt.App.5019-5020. 
Reliance on the Reformed Trust. Numerous individuals acted in reliance 
upon the validity and finality of the Reformation Judgment. The Tort Plaintiffs 
settled their claims against the Trust for nominal damages, Aplt.App.4573, 4682-
4692, and the Fiduciary dissuaded other claimants from pursuing legal claims 
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against the Trust, Aplt.App.6096, 2176, presumably because Jeffs was no longer in 
control. Similarly, in light of the removal of Jeffs, the Private Beneficiary 
Petitioners (and the Tort Plaintiffs) did not pursue their challenges to the 1998 
Restatement. Aplt.App.5204, 5208-5209, 5219-5220, 5732, 5739. In addition, 
other people relied upon the Reformation Judgment in entering into transactions 
involving Trust property. See e.g., Aplt.App.2048, 2059, 4905-4907, 4919-4922, 
4924-4942. (For a more detailed summary of actions taken in reliance upon the 
Reformation Judgment, see Aplt.App. 1912-1914). 
Collateral Attacks on the Final Reformation Judgment. In the latter half 
of 2008, two years after entry of the Reformation Judgment, Jeffs and his followers 
changed tactics. While incarcerated, Jeffs instructed Willie Jessop to lead a 
coalition of followers, retain legal counsel, and demand "protection of their rights," 
but to conceal Jeffs' role in the new litigation strategy so the "coalition" would 
appear as a "group of individuals . . . without bringing in the authorities of the 
Church." Aplt.App.1995-1996. 
Following Jeffs' command, Willie Jessop, Merlin Jessop, and Dan Johnson 
in 2008 filed a motion in the probate court to block the sale of certain Trust 
property, which allegedly interfered with their religious practices. Aplt.App. 8 84-
885.3 The probate court rejected movants' challenge on several grounds, including 
3
 Members of the FLDS Association supported this motion. Aplt.App.4208-4567. 
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that the Reformation Judgment was final and that their claims were barred by 
laches. Aplt.App.874-889. The probate court also found that the movants lacked 
standing. Aplt.App.885-886. The movants did not appeal this ruling. 
The movants subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the probate action, 
which was similarly denied for lack of standing because the probate court had 
found the 1998 Restatement created a charitable trust, and beneficiaries do not 
have standing to raise claims concerning the administration of a charitable trust. 
Aplt.App.6216. The movants appealed that decision to this Court (Appeal No. 
20090691), which appeal is presently stayed. See infra p. 20. 
Plaintiff also collaterally attacked the Reformation Judgment by filing a 
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 
2:08-cv-772DB (the "Federal Court Action"), Aplt.App.7, 469-502, and a 
subsequent petition for extraordinary writ in the Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 
20090859 (the "Extraordinary Writ Action"), Aplt.App.2717-2804. Plaintiff 
stayed the Federal Court Action while this Court acted on the Extraordinary Writ 
Action. Aplt.App.1337-1339. 
The Extraordinary Writ Action. The FLDS Association filed a petition 
for an extraordinary writ pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In the petition, 
the FLDS Association contended, inter alia, the reformation of the Trust violated 
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the First Amendment. The parties filed extensive briefs and submitted over 200 
exhibits, including declarations. Consequently, this Court's file in this action 
consisted of thousands of pages in multiple volumes. In addition, this Court 
received the entire record of the district court in the Probate Action through March 
2010—which consisted of an additional 57 volumes. 
On February 17, 2010, this Court heard lengthy oral argument on the FLDS 
Association's constitutional claims and Appellants' laches defense. Thereafter, on 
August 27, 2010, this Court entered its written Opinion holding that the FLDS 
Association's claims were "barred" under the "equitable doctrine of laches." See 
TAndberg, 2010 UT 57,1f43. 
Specifically, the Court explained that laches is a "delay that works a 
disadvantage to another," consisting of two legal elements: "(1) a party's lack of 
diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence." Id. ^27 
(quotations omitted). With respect to the first factor, this Court found that the 
FLDS Association's members were aware of the probate court's administration 
and reformation of the Trust, that the probate court welcomed their participation in 
the reformation proceedings, that the FLDS Association nevertheless waited three 
years after the reformation of the Trust before filing its petition, and that the FLDS 
Association did not explain why it waited so long or why its delay was reasonable. 
Mf30 . 
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Based on these factual findings, this Court concluded: 
Because of the three-year delay in the face of invitations by the 
district court to participate, and because this delay did not occur 
under circumstances that might excuse it, such as prompt 
negotiations aimed at avoiding litigation, or under 
circumstances that might make us otherwise hesitant to apply 
the doctrine of laches, the FLDS Association has demonstrated 
a lack of diligence in filing this petition. 
Id.^32. 
As to the second laches factor, this Court found that the FLDS Association's 
lack of diligence caused injury to "numerous parties," id. ^|43, who relied upon the 
reformation of the Trust, changed their positions, and made irreversible decisions 
based upon the unappealed and unchallenged rulings of the district court, id. ffi[33-
35. For example, this Court found that the Special Fiduciary had entered into 
transactions on the assumption of the validity of the reformed Trust that could not 
be undone. Id. ^33. The Court also found prejudice to the Tort Plaintiffs, who 
agreed to settle their lawsuits against the Trust only because of the reformation. Id. 
P4. 
The Court summarized its laches decision as follows: 
In sum, many individuals have relied upon the district court's final 
order from over three years ago, and the FLDS Association has given 
no adequate explanation for its delay in appealing or otherwise 
petitioning for relief. The FLDS Association has shown a lack of 
diligence in challenging the modification of the Trust, and this lack of 
diligence has operated to the detriment of others. The FLDS 
Association offers no adequate explanation for its delay and no other 
circumstances exist that might make us otherwise hesitant to apply 
laches. 
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M P5. 4 
The Federal Court Action. The FLDS Association did not seek review of 
the Lindberg decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. Instead, the FLDS Association 
renewed the Federal Court Action, which, as the federal district court recognized, 
raised "virtually the same" claims raised in the Extraordinary Writ Action. 
Aplt.App.34. The defendants in the Federal Court Action raised numerous 
defenses, including that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with a state 
court's administration of a Utah trust and that the federal court was bound, under 
the doctrine of res judicata, by this Court's finding that plaintiffs claims are barred 
by laches. Aplt.App.49, 3209-3219. 
The federal district court issued a temporary restraining order, 
Aplt.App.3203-3205, and requested further briefing on the question whether this 
Court's laches decision in Lindberg was binding, Aplt.App.12 (Docket No. 87). In 
the extensive briefing that followed, the FLDS Association agreed that, if the 
Lindberg decision is "on the merits," then its claims must be dismissed. 
Aplt.App.56. Plaintiff argued, however, that a dismissal of claims on grounds of 
4
 This Court further held that claims that arose "from facts that occurred after the 
Trust was modified" were not barred by laches. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ffl[39, 43. 
None of those claims were ripe, however, because the allegedly unconstitutional i 
conduct had not occurred and was not imminent. Id. ^[41. 
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laches is not a decision "on the merits" under Utah law, and therefore the Lindberg 
decision is not preclusive in federal court. Id. 
The Entry of the Preliminary Injunction. Without holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the federal district court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on 
February 24, 2011, granting the FLDS Association's motion for preliminary 
injunction and denying the defendants' motions to dismiss. Aplt.App.22-69. 
With respect to the issue of res judicata, the district court found that Utah 
law is not settled on the question whether the dismissal of claims on laches 
grounds is a decision "on the merits" that is entitled to preclusive effect. 
Aplt.App.56. Although the court found that there is "no clear precedent from the 
Utah Supreme Court or any other Utah state court" regarding the matter, id., it 
declined to certify the question to this Court, as requested by the defendants. 
Instead, the district court inferred that Utah would likely reject the majority view 
and would adopt instead a two-tiered approach under which "laches is entitled to 
preclusive effect in some cases, namely where there is some appropriate attention 
paid to the merits, and not in others." Aplt.App.62. Because the district court 
thought this Court in Lindberg did not pay appropriate attention to the merits of the 
FLDS Association's underlying constitutional claims, it declined to accord that 
decision preclusive effect. Aplt.App.56-64. 
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The federal district court likewise denied the numerous jurisdictional and 
procedural bars to injunctive relief advanced by the defendants, including the 
probate exception to federal court jurisdiction, Younger abstention, and the defense 
that plaintiffs complaint was barred by laches. Aplt.App.49-52. In contrast, the 
court found that the probate court's reformation of the Trust likely violated the 
First Amendment. Aplt.App.34-49. 
On April 7, 2011, the court entered the preliminary injunction proposed by 
the FLDS Association, which functionally invalidated the probate court's 
reformation of the Trust and its administration over the Trust. Aplt.App.70-74. 
The preliminary injunction order suspended the Special Fiduciary, enjoined 
administration of the Reformed Trust, ordered the Special Fiduciary to turn over all 
non-privileged Trust records to the COP, and ordered the Special Fiduciary to turn 
over all Trust assets to the control of the COP. Id. The injunction allowed the 
COP to administer the Trust property "according to its religious principles," while 
adding several "additional terms and restrictions." Aplt.App.72-73. 
Additional Briefing in the Utah Supreme Court. After the entry of the 
federal court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, this Court entered an Order in 
two related cases pending before it.5 Noting that the federal district court's 
5
 The first case, Appeal No. 20090691, is from the probate court's order denying 
standing to certain FLDS leaders challenging the administration of the reformed 
Trust. Aplt.App.4701. The second case, Appeal No. 20091006, is from the 
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analysis of the laches issue "contradicts [the] decision in Lindberg" this Court 
requested supplemental briefing "regarding the preclusive effect of our decision in 
Lindberg and on the implications of that question in these cases." Aplt.App.4702-
4703. 
After receiving supplemental briefing and hearing oral argument on April 
12, 2011, this Court on June 13, 2011 entered an order staying both appeals 
pending the Tenth Circuit's ruling on the appeal of the federal district court's 
preliminary injunction order. 
The Tenth Circuit Court Stays the Preliminary Injunction. The 
defendants in the Federal Court Action appealed the preliminary injunction, and 
Judge Lindberg filed an emergency motion asking to the Tenth Circuit to stay the 
preliminary injunction pending appeal. Emergency Motion to Stay, Doc. No. 
01018621127 (10th Cir. Apr. 13,2011). Judge Lindberg instructed the Fiduciary 
not to turn over Trust documents or assets pending appellate review of the 
preliminary injunction, but to minimize conflict with the federal court, she ordered 
the Special Fiduciary not to initiate any affirmative action, other than as necessary 
to protect the assets of the Trust Id. at Attachment E. 
probate court's order disqualifying one of the FLDS Association's law firms, 
which formerly represented the Trust, from representing parties in actions adverse 
to the Trust. Aplt.App.4702-03. 
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Thereafter, the federal district court ordered Judge Lindberg to show cause 
why she should not be held in contempt. Aplt.App.4951-4952. He also threatened 
to send U.S. Marshals to ensure her appearance. Notice of Information at 2, 
Document No. 01018622162 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2011). On April 15, 2011, the 
Tenth Circuit issued a Stay Order, temporarily staying both the Show Cause Order 
and the Preliminary Injunction. Stay Order, Document No. 01018623246 (10th 
Cir. Apr. 15, 2011). After additional briefing, the Tenth Circuit ordered that its 
stay shall remain in effect until dissolved by that court. Order, Doc. No. 
01018630078 (10th Cir. Apr. 27, 2011). The stay of the Preliminary Injunction 
Order has remained in place since that time, and the Trust remains under the 
administration of the probate court and the Special Fiduciary. 
The Tenth Circuit Certifies A State Law Question To The Utah 
Supreme Court. In addition to briefing the merits of the appeal, the 
Appellants/Defendants filed motions asking the Tenth Circuit to certify to this 
Court the question of the preclusive effect under Utah law of a judgment 
dismissing claims on grounds of laches. See, e.g., Judge Lindberg and Special 
Fiduciary Wisan's Motion to Certify, Doc. No. 01018686652 (10th Cir., Aug. 1, 
2011); Utah Attorney Genera Shurtleffs Motion to Certify, Doc. No. 
01018686494 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 2011). The FLDS Association opposed 
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certification. Appellee's Mem. In Opp. to Motions to Certify, Doc. No. 
01018736082 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2010). 
On February 23, 2012, the Tenth Circuit granted the motions to certify and, 
on March 2, 2012, issued a separate order explaining the reasons for granting the 
motions and stating the specific state law question certified to this Court. On 
March 16, 2012, this Court issued an order accepting the certification of the state 
law question. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should confirm that under Utah law, dismissal of a petition for an 
extraordinary writ on grounds of laches in a written opinion is a decision "on the 
merits" such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred. 
The doctrine of res judicata is " 'premised on the principle that a controversy 
should be adjudicated only once.'" Mack v. Utah Dep 't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, 
1}29, 221 P.3d 194 (quoting Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, f23, 34 
P.3d 180). The doctrine is intended "to protect litigants from the burden of 
relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and to promote 
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 
409 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, courts—including the Supreme 
Court, Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190 (1947)—have recognized that a prior 
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adjudication does not need to reach the "ultimate substantive" merits in order to 
qualify as a decision "on the merits" with preclusive effect. Thus, courts— 
including this Court, State v. Cahoon, 2009 UT 9, f l l , 203 P.3d 957—have 
repeatedly applied res judicata to hold that a dismissal of an action on statute of 
limitations grounds precludes relitigation of the underlying substantive claim even 
though the court did not reach the "merits" of the substantive claim. 
Although this Court has not directly addressed whether laches 
determinations should have preclusive effect, the logic of applying that doctrine to 
dismissals on statute of limitations grounds compels extending it to the laches 
context as well. A fortiori, if res judicata applies to the determination that a claim 
should be barred because it is untimely, it should apply where there are express 
judicial findings that the plaintiff unduly delayed the filing of its claim and 
allowing that claim to proceed would cause substantial prejudice to parties that had 
justifiably relied on the status quo. Indeed, allowing relitigation in such a context 
would defeat the very purpose of the laches doctrine. Numerous courts have 
reached the same conclusion, and it is hornbook law that "[t]he same rule [that 
applies to statute of limitations dismissals] applies to a dismissal on such 
analogous theories as laches or undue delay in initiating an administrative 
proceeding." 18A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§4441 (2d ed. 2002). 
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That this Court dismissed the FLDS Association's claims on laches grounds 
in context of a petition pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
does not deprive the decision of preclusive effect. Although the decision whether 
to grant relief on a Rule 65B petition is "left to the sound discretion of the court 
hearing the petition," State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ^[23, 127 P.3d 682, it is "well 
settled that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to judgments in mandamus and 
prohibition proceedings[.]" E.T. Tsai, Annotation, Judgment Granting or Denying 
Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition as Res Judicata, 21 A.L.R. 3d 206, §2 (1968). 
Thus, in Gates v. Taylor, 2000 UT 33, ffi[l-2 997 P.2d 903 (per curiam), this 
Court held that where a Utah court denies a petition for extraordinary writ in a 
written opinion and it "is clear that the matter was decided on the merits," the 
"petitioners are barred by the doctrine of res judicata from seeking the same relief 
from another court in a subsequent action or petition. "Sound policy, principles of 
judicial economy, and fairness to the parties require that final judgments on the 
merits be subject only to proper appellate review and not to successive relitigation 
in new courts." Id. ^3. 
That is the case here. After extensive briefing—including submission of 
affidavits and exhibits—and oral argument, this Court issued a thorough written 
opinion "hold[ing] that the FLDS Association's claims regarding the district 
court's modification of the Trust are barred by the equitable doctrine of laches." 
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Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, H1J24-25 & n.13 (citing Renn v. J7to/z State Bd of Pardons, 
904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995)). In reaching this conclusion, this Court made 4 
detailed factual and legal findings both with regard to plaintiffs "lack of 
diligence" and the "injury [to third-parties] resulting from that lack of diligence." i 
Id. \21. In short, this Court found that Jeffs and the FLDS Association's members 
made a strategic and conscious decision not to challenge the reformed Trust, and 
numerous parties relied on the assumed validity of the reformed Trust. It is thus 
clear that this Court dismissed the FLDS Association's Rule 65B petition not on 
discretionary grounds, but because it concluded that it would be inequitable to 
allow plaintiff to challenge the validity of the reformation of the Trust at this late 
date. 
ARGUMENT 
As explained below, this Court's decision that a claim is barred by laches is , 
res judicata to all Utah state courts. And because Utah courts cannot relitigate a 
laches determination made by this Court, under 28 U.S.C. §1738, federal district 
courts may not either. See Carpenter v. Reed, 757 F.2d 218, 219 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(federal courts are required to give res judicata effect to state judgment to the 
extent state courts would give such effect). 
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I. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA PROMOTES JUDICIAL 
ECONOMY AND PROTECTS LITIGANTS FROM THE BURDEN 
OF RELITIGATING A CLAIM WITH THE SAME PARTY. 
The doctrine of res judicata has two related but distinct branches: claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion. Mack, 2009 UT 47, \2% 221 P.3d 194. Claim 
preclusion bars litigants from relitigating the same claims that were raised in a 
prior action between the same parties that resulted in a final judgment "on the 
merits." See, e.g., Macris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, f 19, 16 P.3d 
1214; Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). Issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel) prevents parties or their 
privies from relitigating, in a second suit raising different claims, "facts and issues" 
that "were fully litigated in the first suit." Macris, 2000 UT 93,1fl9, 16 P.3d 1214 
(quotations omitted); Copper State Thrift & Loan, 735 P.2d at 389. 
Both branches, however, are "premised on the principle that a controversy 
should be adjudicated only once." Mack, 2009 UT 47, f29, 221 P.3d 194 (quoting 
Nebeker, 2001 UT 74,123, 34 P.3d 180). The doctrine of res judicata thus serves 
"the important judicial policy" of "preventing issues once litigated from being 
relitigated." Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 
1983). It protects litigants "from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with 
the same party or his privy" and promotes "judicial economy by preventing 
needless litigation." Smith, 793 P.2d at 409; see also Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 224 
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i 
F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000) ("The fundamental policies underlying the 
doctrine of res judicata ... are finality, judicial economy, preventing repetitive 
litigation and forum-shopping, and 'the interest in bringing litigation to an end.55'). 
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, res judicata means that "[o]nce i 
a party has fought out a matter in litigation with the other party, he cannot later 
renew that duel;5 Comm V v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948). 
H. THE DISMISSAL OF A CLAIM ON GROUNDS OF LACHES IS A 
DECISION "ON THE MERITS" FOR PURPOSES OF RES 
JUDICATA EVEN THOUGH IT DOES NOT DECIDE THE 
"ULTIMATE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES" OF THE CLAIM. 
Although a judgment must be "on the 'merits'" to bar subsequent litigation 
of the same claim between the same parties, it is a "misconception of res judicata 
to assume that the doctrine does not come into operation if a court has not passed 
on the 'merits' in the sense of the ultimate substantive issues of a litigation." 
Angel, 330 U.S. at 190. Rather, "[a]n adjudication declining to reach such ultimate 
substantive issues may bar a second attempt to reach them in another court of the 
State," because the "'merits' of a claim are disposed of when they are refused 
enforcement." Id. 
Thus, if a court says to the plaintiff '"you are too late' or otherwise wraps up 
a case in a way that indicates that the plaintiff has irrevocably failed," the decision 
"may be 'on the merits' for purposes of preclusion even though the court did not 
resolve the merits" of the plaintiffs underlying claim. Am. Nat'I Bank & Trust Co. 
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v. City of Chic, 826 F.2d 1547, 1553 (7th Cir. 1987). For example, numerous state 
and federal courts have held that the dismissal of a claim as barred by the statute of 
limitations is a decision "on the merits" that bars relitigation of the claim in the 
same system of courts.6 See, e.g., Murphy v. Klein Tools, Inc., 935 F.2d 1127, 
1128-29 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (dismissal based on statute of limitations is 
a judgment on the merits); Shoup v. Bell & Howell Co., 872 F.2d 1178, 1179 (4th 
Cir. 1989) ("We hold that the federal district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' 
Pennsylvania action on statute of limitations grounds is a final judgment on the 
merits."); Rose v. Town of Harwich, 778 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.) 
("our survey of recent cases suggests a clear trend toward giving claim-preclusive 
effect to dismissals based on statutes of limitations") (citing cases); PRC Harris, 
Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The longstanding rule in 
6
 If two jurisdictions each provide a cause of action for the same claim, but one 
jurisdiction applies a longer statute of limitations than the other, the traditional rule 
is that a dismissal of the claim barred by the shorter statute of limitations may not 
bar the plaintiff from proceeding with the claim in the jurisdiction with the longer 
statute of limitations. See, e.g., 18A Wright et al., supra, §4441. The rationale for 
this rule is that a finding "that the action has been brought after the expiration of 
the statutory period, and, as a matter of law, that remedy is barred" in the first 
jurisdiction should not bind a court in the second jurisdiction that has decided, as a 
matter of law, to provide a longer statute of limitations. See, e.g., Warner v. 
Buffalo Drydock Co., 61 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1933). But that rule has no 
application where, as here, "the second forum would decide independently to apply 
the same statute of limitations as led to the first dismissal." 18A Wright et al., 
supra, §4441; cf Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 245-48 (1988) (§1983 adopts the 
state statute of limitations for personal injury actions). 
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I 
this Circuit," is that "a dismissal for failure to comply with the statute of 
limitations will operate as an adjudication on the merits . . . ."); Nathan vRowan, 
651 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1981) (same); Myers v. Bull, 599 F.2d 863, 865 (8th 
Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (same); Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 i 
F.2d 464, 466-67 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1950) (same); N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Bos. 
Med. Grp., 906 A.2d 1042, 1052 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (our holding that a 
statute of limitations dismissal is "an adjudication on the merits under the doctrine 
of res judicata" is "consistent with the majority of state courts to have addressed 
this issue") (citing cases); Smith v. Russell Sage Coll, 429 N.E.2d 746, 750 (N.Y. 
1981) (even if statute of limitations is sometimes viewed as "procedural," a 
dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is "sufficiently close to the merits for 
claim preclusion purposes to bar a second action"). In short, "[t]he rules of 
finality, both statutory and judge made, treat a dismissal on statute-of-limitations { 
grounds the same way they treat a dismissal for failure to state a claim, for failure 
to prove substantive liability, or for failure to prosecute: as a judgment on the 
merits." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995).7 
7
 In the Tenth Circuit, the FLDS Association opposed certification on the ground 
that because it filed suit in federal court rather than state court, this Court's 
dismissal of its claims on grounds of laches in Lindberg has no preclusive effect on 
the federal litigation notwithstanding whether or not laches would be preclusive of 
relitigation in Utah courts. Appellee's Mem. In Opp. to Motions to Certify at 16-
19, Doc. No. 01018736082 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2010). The Tenth Circuit implicitly 
rejected this argument in certifying the question whether Utah courts accord 
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In the criminal context, this Court has similarly stated that "collateral 
estoppel prevents the government from bringing identical charges against a 
defendant if the original charges were dismissed for violating the statute of 
limitations." Cahoon, 2009 UT 9, fl4, 203 P.3d 957 (emphasis omitted) (citing 
United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916)). In so doing, this Court 
followed Oppenheimer, in which the United States Supreme Court applied civil 
law principles of res judicata to the dismissal of an indictment on statute of 
limitations grounds and held that "[a] plea of the statute of limitations is a plea to 
the merits, and however the issue was raised in the former case, after judgment 
upon it, it could not be reopened in a later prosecution." Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. at 
87-88 (citation omitted). The Court reasoned that "the 5th Amendment was not 
intended to do away with what in the civil law is a fundamental principle of justice 
preclusive effect to a dismissal of a petition for extraordinary writ on grounds of 
laches, and it was right to do so. The "full faith and credit" statute requires federal 
courts to afford state court judgments the same "full faith and credit" they would 
have "in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. §1738. Thus, if Lindberg would bar 
the FLDS Association from relitigating its constitutional challenge to the 
reformation of the Trust in Utah state court, it also bars the association's attempt to 
relitigate the same constitutional claim in federal court. See, e.g., Jarrett v. 
Gramling, 841 F.2d 354, 358 (10th Cir. 1988) (because Oklahoma state court 
judgment in mandamus action barred plaintiff from bringing a separate §1983 
action in state court, it also barred plaintiff from bringing the §1983 action in 
federal court); DeVargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(New Mexico state court judgment dismissing plaintiffs §1983 claims on grounds 
of statute of limitations was "'on the merits' for res judicata purposes" and thus 
bars plaintiffs attempt to raise same claims in §1983 action in federal court), 
overruled on other grounds by Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1987). 
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in order, when a man once has been acquitted on the merits, to enable the 
government to prosecute him a second time." Id. at 88 (citation omitted). 
Just as the dismissal of a claim on grounds of statute of limitations is a decision on 
the merits that bars relitigation of the claim, the same rule applies "to a dismissal i 
on such analogous theories as laches or undue delay in initiating an administrative 
proceeding." 18A Wright et al., supra, §4441. Thus, a number of federal and state 
courts have recognized that a dismissal on the basis of laches is res judicata. See, 
e.g., Smith v. City of Chic, 820 F.2d 916, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1987) ("'Dismissals 
( 
based on laches or the running of a statute of limitations preclude a second action 
based on the same claim brought in the same system of courts.'"); Cannon v. 
Loyola Univ. of Chic, 784 F.2d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[t]he disposition of { 
[constitutional] claims on grounds of laches is ". . . a judgment on the merits" for 
purposes of res judicata); Murphy v. A/S Sobral, 187 F. Supp. 163, 164 (S.D.N.Y. i 
1960) (holding that prior ruling dismissing claim on laches grounds was res 
judicata); Day v. Estate ofWiswall 
, 381 P.2d 217, 220 (Ariz. 1963) (according preclusive effect to a California 
judgment rejecting a probate claim on the basis of laches); cf Paxton v. Ward, 199 
F.3d 1197, 1206 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) (dismissal on the basis of laches is a 
decision "on the merits" for purposes of statutory provision that habeas relief 
generally may not be granted to a claim adjudicated "on the merits" in state court). 
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Indeed, there are particularly compelling reasons for this Court to treat a 
dismissal on grounds of laches as a decision "on the merits" for purposes of res 
judicata. To dismiss a claim on laches, the court must find that the plaintiff 
showed a lack of diligence in bringing the claim, and the plaintiffs lack of 
diligence harmed the defendants or third parties. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ^ [27, 238 
P.3d 1054; see also infra pp. 35-37. To hold this dismissal is not "on the merits"— 
and thus the dilatory plaintiff may raise the claim in a second action 
notwithstanding the harm that causes to others—would directly undermine the 
interest in repose that the doctrine of laches is designed to protect. Cf. Rose, 778 
F.2d at 81 (holding that a Massachusetts state court dismissal of an eminent 
domain action on statute of limitations grounds is a decision "'on the merits'" 
because allowing "a once-tardy plaintiff to bring a second action "would directly 
undercut the policy underlying the limitations provision"). 
The federal district court in this case recognized "the essential fairness in the 
view that at some point litigation over a particular controversy must come to an 
end." Aplt.App.58. It nevertheless held that the dismissal of claims on grounds of 
laches is "entitled to preclusive effect" only if the court making the laches finding 
paid "appropriate attention" to the underlying merits of the claims. Aplt.App.60. 
That holding finds no support in precedent or logic and should be rejected by this 
Court. 
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Although the district court correctly stated that the Arizona Supreme Court 
in Day, 381 P.2d at 220, applied res judicata to a finding of laches made '"after a 
consideration of the circumstances and merits of a suit,5" Aplt.App.60, it is clear 
from the Day opinion that the laches decision was based not on the court's i 
evaluation of the "merits" of plaintiff s underlying claim of legal entitlement to a 
portion of her stepmother's estate, but rather on the "merits" of the application of 
the doctrine of laches to the particular facts of that case. See Day, 381 P.2d at 220 
(noting that the prior court had entered a judgment that "plaintiff take nothing" by 
i 
reason of the doctrine of laches because the "separate and community interests" 
she sought to reach had been "intermingled" over the years in which she had 
delayed filing suit, and it "would now be inequitable to segregate and evaluate 
such interests] separately") (quotations omitted). The decision is thus fully 
consistent with the majority rule that a judgment holding claims barred by laches is < 
o 
a "judgment on the merits" for purposes of res judicata. 
Although there is language in Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, 5 P.3d 874, 884 
(Cal. 2000), that a judgment on grounds of laches is not a judgment "on the merits" 
for purposes of res judicata because the "defense of laches has nothing to do with 
the merits of the cause against which it is asserted," the context in which that 
statement was made is entirely distinguishable from the issues before this Court. 
Johnson was an assistant city manager who alleged he was fired for opposing 
sexual discrimination by another city employee. Id. at 877. After the city 
personnel board rejected his grievance and found his job was eliminated for 
economic reasons, he filed suit raising several causes of action. The California 
Supreme Court held that Johnson's challenge to the personnel board decision was 
barred by laches, so the board's finding that he was discharged for 
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More fundamentally, if courts were to relax principles of res judicata 
whenever they thought a litigant had a strong claim on the merits, the doctrine 
"would fail to serve its purposes of promoting judicial economy and repose." 
Rose, 778 F.2d at 82 (holding that a state court's dismissal of an eminent domain 
action on statute of limitations grounds barred plaintiff from asserting the same 
claim in federal court under the Taking Clause notwithstanding plaintiffs 
argument that "he has a meritorious claim" and it is therefore "unfair to deny him 
relief"). Even if a court might think "a fairer result might be achieved" in some 
"individual instances," the "litigation of stale claims and the resulting uncertainty 
would mean injustice or hardship" most of the time. Id. "For this reason, the 
Supreme Court has instructed [courts] not to stray from traditional principles of res 
judicata by making any 'ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case.'" 
Id. (quotingFederatedDep'tStores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981)). 
nondiscriminatory reasons was final under state law and binding on his claim 
under the state Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. at 880, 884. But the 
board's finding was not binding on Johnson's claim under Title VII of the federal 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, because under governing United States Supreme Court 
precedent, "Title VII claims are not precluded by administrative decisions that 
have not been judicially reviewed on their merits." Id. at 882. Because the court 
held that Johnson's challenge to the personnel board findings were barred by 
laches, it did not review the board's findings "on the merits" and thus its judgment 
did not bar litigation of the Title VII claim. Id. at 884. 
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III. A UTAH COURT'S DENIAL OF A PETITION FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT UNDER RULE 65B IS RES JUDICATA IF 
IT AFFIRMATIVELY APPEARS THAT THE DENIAL WAS 
INTENDED TO BE ON THE MERITS. 
When this Court denies a petition for extraordinary writ under Rule 65B on 
i 
the merits, the denial of the writ is entitled to the same preclusive effect as the 
disposition on the merits of any other case pending before the Court. Rule 65B of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits a person "to petition the court for * 
extraordinary relief if "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). The court may grant the petitioner any of the remedies ^ 
that were available under the common law writs, such as certiorari, mandamus, quo 
warranto, prohibition, or habeas corpus. Reriri, 904 P.2d at 682-83 & n.3. 
i 
Although the decision whether to grant relief on a Rule 65B petition is "left to the 
sound discretion of the court hearing the petition," Barrett, 2005 UT 127, ^[23, 
i 
P.3d 682, it is "well settled that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to 
judgments in mandamus and prohibition proceedings," 21 A.L.R. 3d 206, §2. In 
other words, "the special character of these proceedings does not, ipso facto, ( 
preclude a judgment rendered therein from operating as res judicata in another 
action or proceeding." Id. "All that is required is careful attention to the nature of < 
the initial proceeding and the basis of decision." 18A Wright, Miller, et al., supra, 
§4445. 
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If the court denies a Rule 65B petition without opinion under circumstances 
that are "consistent with the view [that the] court merely refused to exercise its 
original jurisdiction, or . . . was of the opinion [that] an extraordinary writ was not 
a proper remedy," the denial of the writ is "not res judicata" and does not bar the 
petitioner's attempt to litigate the issues in a subsequent action. Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 575 P.2d 705, 708 (Utah 1978); see also 21 A.L.R. 3d 
206, § 18 ("In a number of cases the courts have held or recognized the rule to the 
effect that a judgment denying a writ of prohibition without written opinion is not 
res judicata unless the sole possible ground of the denial was that the court acted 
on the merits, or unless it affirmatively appears that such denial was intended to be 
on the merits."). 
If, however, a court denies a petition for extraordinary writ on the merits, 
then "a right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue" in the petition and "directly 
determined" by the court "cannot be disputed in subsequent actions between the 
same parties or their privies." Meagher Cnty. Newlan Creek Water Dist. v. Walter, 
547 P.2d 850, 853 (Mont. 1976); see also, e.g., Ramirez-Pabon v. Bd. of 
Personnel, 254 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1958) (it is "a clearly correct application of the 
settled doctrine of res judicata" to hold that a "plaintiff cannot maintain a second 
suit on the same cause of action" when the question was presented to the court in a 
mandamus petition and "decided against her" on the merits); City of Elmhurst v. 
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Kegerreis, 64 N.E.2d 450, 455 (111. 1945) (where the "question was determined in 
the mandamus suit adversely to the contention of the appellant in this suit/' res 
judicata prevents it from being relitigated in a subsequent proceeding); State ex rel 
Hamilton v. Cohn, 95 P.2d 38, 41 (Wash. 1939) ("an adjudication made in a i 
mandamus proceeding would bar a new proceeding under the same rule that would 
apply when a judgment of a court of record is set up as a bar to a new suit or 
action"). 
Utah courts follow this rule as well. In Gates v. Taylor, 2000 UT 33, ffifl-2, 
997 P.2d 903, this Court held that where a Utah court denies a petition for 
extraordinary writ in a written opinion that, "is clear that the matter was decided on 
the merits," the "petitioners are barred by the doctrine of res judicata from seeking 
the same relief from another court in a subsequent petition. "Sound policy, 
principles of judicial economy, and fairness to the parties require that final 
judgments on the merits be subject only to proper appellate review and not to 
successive relitigation in new courts." Id. ^3; see also Burleigh v. Turner, 388 
P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1964) (denial of a Rule 65B petition for writ of habeas corpus 
"is res judicata as to [a] subsequent proceeding" for habeas corpus relief). "When 
a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated directly upon a particular matter, 
the same point is not open to inquiry in a subsequent action for the same cause and 
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between the same parties." Gates, 2000 UT 33, f3, 997 P.2d 903 (alterations and 
quotations omitted). 
IV. BECAUSE THIS COURT HELD THAT THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE MODIFICATION OF THE UEP TRUST IS 
BARRED BY LACHES, THE DISMISSAL OF THE RULE 65B 
PETITION IS A DECISION ON THE MERITS THAT IS RES 
JUDICATA IN A SUBSEQUENT ACTION. 
As noted, in Lindberg, after extensive briefing (including submission of 
affidavits and exhibits) and argument, this Court adjudicated directly upon the 
question whether the FLDS Association's challenge to the modification of the UEP 
Trust is barred by laches. In a detailed and thorough 45 paragraph written opinion, 
this Court dismissed the FLDS Association's petition, "hold[ing] that the FLDS 
Association's claims regarding the district court's modification of the Trust are 
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches." Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, Hf24-25 & 
n.13, 238 P.3d 1054 (quoting Renn, 904 P.2d at 684). 
In so holding the FLDS Association's claims barred by laches, this Court 
applied the same laches test that is applicable to claims commenced in Utah courts 
under other jurisdictional grants. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, fflf27-29, 238 P.3d 1054 
(citing Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (action 
filed in district court by orthodontist to recover against bank for wrongful 
acceptance of patients' checks bearing forged endorsements), and Papanikolas 
Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 
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1975) (action filed in district court to enforce a restrictive covenant)). That laches 
test "has two elements: (1) a party's lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting 
from that lack of diligence." Lindberg, 2010 UT 51,1f27, 238 P.3d 1054. 
With respect to the first element, the Court found that "the FLDS i 
Association has demonstrated a lack of diligence in filing this petition" because it 
delayed filing suit for three years, "despite assurances by the [district] court that 
participation" in the litigation to modify the Trust "was welcome." Id. ffi|30, 32. 
Furthermore, "this delay did not occur under circumstances that might excuse it, 
i 
such as prompt negotiations aimed at avoiding litigation," as occurred in 
Paponikolas Bros. Id. ^32. 
The Court also found the second element of the laches test met because the 
"lack of diligence has caused injury to those who relied on the Trust's modification 
during the FLDS Association's delay." Id. ^33. Specifically, the Special Fiduciary i 
"has made choices over the years, many expressly approved by Judge Lindberg, 
that cannot be undone." Id. (quotations omitted). "Other interested persons, 
including Trust Participants who are not members of the Petitioner association, 
have also made irreversible decisions and changed their positions based on [the] 
i 
unappealed and heretofore unchallenged final orders" of the district court. Id. 
(quotations omitted). Finally, the FLDS Association's delay in filing the petition 
injured the "Original Interested Individuals, whose looming default judgments led 
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to the district court's reformation of the Trust." Id. f34. The FLDS Association's 
delay "caused the Individuals to change positions on their own claims," and any 
relief "granted the FLDS Association would operate against the interests of the 
Original Interested Individuals." Id. Because both prongs of the laches test were 
met, this Court "dismissed] the FLDS Association's Trust modification claims 
pursuant to the doctrine of laches." Id. ^[35. 
In sum, it is clear from the Court's opinion that the FLDS Association's 
challenge to the reformation of the UEP Trust was dismissed because it is barred 
by laches, and not because the Court declined to exercise its discretion to grant 
relief under Rule 65B. The Court's laches finding is therefore res judicata and bars 
the FLDS Association's attempt to relitigate its challenge to the reformation of the 
Trust in a subsequent action.10 
9
 Because the Court held that the FLDS Association's claims are barred by laches, 
it "decline[d] to reach the merits of [the Association's] claims." Lindberg, 2010 
UT 51, f43, 238 P.3d 1054. As noted above, however, a decision dismissing a 
claim on grounds of laches (like a finding that a claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations) is a decision "on the merits" for purposes of res judicata, even though 
it does not address the "merits" of the plaintiffs underlying claim. See supra 
Section III. 
Of course, this does not mean that Lindberg categorically precludes the FLDS 
Association from raising any claim related to administration of the Trust. This 
Court's decision made clear that while the FLDS Association may not challenge 
the reformation of the Trust, its claims that certain Trust beneficiaries may be 
denied a share of Trust property based on their religious beliefs are not barred by 
laches. Although this Court held that these claims were not ripe because such 
conduct had not occurred, plaintiff may raise them if the Trust property is 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should confirm that under Utah law, dismissal of a petition for an 
extraordinary writ on grounds of laches in a written opinion is a decision "on the 
merits" such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred. Accordingly, this 
Court should further confirm that its decision in Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054, was on the 
merits and that no party or privity of any party can relitigate any claim that was or 
could have been raised in that matter. 
RULE 24(a)(ll) STATEMENT 
No addendum is necessary under Rule 24(a)(ll) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
distributed in the future in an unconstitutional manner. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ^f 
39-40, 238 P.3d 1054. 
( 
i 
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